Brief of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services

Facts: 

Joshua DeShaney, born in Wyoming in 1979, moved to Wisconsin with his father in 1980 after his parents divorced.  After a police report of abuse and a later hospital visit to treat Joshua's bruises and abrasions in January 1983, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services obtained a court order to keep Joshua in the hospital's custody.  A child protective team returned Joshua three days later to his father, who agreed in writing to enroll Joshua in Headstart, receive counseling, and tell his girlfriend to move out.  A few weeks later the department heard that Joshua had again been in the hospital but concluded there was no evidence of abuse.

A social worker visited the father's home five times in 1983.  She observed that Joshua had bumps and scrapes on several occasions and that the father was not adhering to the terms of his agreement with the department, but she took no action.  The department also took no action when the hospital notified it in November 1983 that Joshua had again been treated for suspicious injuries.

In January 1984 the social worker visited the home, but she was told she could not see Joshua because he had the flu.  She was told that Joshua had recently fainted when she returned in March, but she did not request to see him.  The next day Joshua's father beat him severely, causing brain damage and permanent retardation.  Doctors discovered previous injuries to Joshua's head and entire body.  As a result, Joshua's father was convicted of child abuse.

Procedural History:

DeShaney sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of liberty without due process of law.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

Issue:

Although a state-run social services department extensively investigated claims that Joshua was a child abuse victim and actively monitored such abuse, it took grossly insufficient action to protect Joshua from the abuse.  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  Does the state's reckless failure to protect Joshua from his father's abuse violate the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of liberty without due process of law?

Holding:

No.  The Fourteenth Amendment does not impose a general affirmative duty upon the state to protect individuals from private violence.  Because the state's recklessness was not a cause of Joshua's harm and did not contribute to the injuries inflicted by his father, the state did not deprive Joshua of any liberty or property right.

Reasoning:

Majority opinion: Rehnquist

I.   Theory: Defendants deprived Joshua of his liberty by recklessly failing to protect him from his father's abuse. 

A. Rule: The state has no duty to protect people from private violence.

1. The constitution negatively, rather than positively, protects people's liberty.

• That is, it generally does not require states to take protective action, but it prohibits states from taking actions which affirmatively infringe upon rights and liberties. 

2. Once a state provides certain protection, however, it may not selectively deny any disfavored minority group the benefits of that protection.

B. Therefore, Joshua had no liberty or property right in the state's providing him affirmative protection from his father's abuse.

II.         Theory: Because the state was in a "special relationship" with Joshua, it was obligated to provide him protection from his father's abuse.  The state's failure to provide such protection denied Joshua of liberty without due process of law.

• Joshua was deprived of his liberty (he is retarded and institutionalized for life), and the state could be held liable for that deprivation if it was somehow complicit in the abuse.

A. Causation: General tort principles require that the state's actions must have increased the probability that Joshua would suffer abuse.

• The Court concludes that causation is lacking because Joshua's father would have abused him even if the state had never been involved.

B. The common-law tort concept that a botched rescue attempt deters others from acting is not applicable to constitutional law.  The mere possibility that the Department deterred others from helping is not enough to establish that it deprived Joshua of any rights.

C. The state could be liable if it recklessly placed Joshua in a dangerous situation, but it was not reckless when it originally returned Joshua to his father's care because it did not have the later-discovered evidence of abuse.

D. Special relationship theory: Joshua argued that once the state knows that a child may be in an abusive situation, "special relationship" arises between the state and the child.  The state then has a constitutional duty to protect the child from the abuse under the Due Process clause.

1.  The special relationship theory is based on the proposition that when the state takes a person into custody or otherwise restrains an individual against his or her own will, it has a constitutional duty to assume responsibility for the individual's safety and well-being.  This duty is imposed because the state has foreclosed private self-help remedies by affirmatively limiting the individual's freedom, making the individual unable to act on his or her own behalf.

2. Joshua argued that the special relationship theory applied to this case because the state knew that Joshua was in danger of abuse and actively became involved in Joshua's life by investigating and monitoring his situation.  By doing so, Joshua argued, the state undertook the duty to protect Joshua from this danger, and its actions discouraged other parties from acting to protect him.

3. The Court rejects this argument because Joshua was not confined by the state or harmed by a state actor.  The state may have been aware of the danger Joshua faced, but it played no part in creating the danger and did nothing to make Joshua ay more vulnerable to it.  At any rate, Wisconsin did not award custody of Joshua to his father; another state (Wyoming) placed him in the situation.   

4. Problems with the special relationship theory

• Increases the cost of providing protection, because the state faces a lawsuit if it does not provide the services, but it also faces a lawsuit if it provides services which fail
• Forces federal courts to get intimately involved in child welfare issues, of which they have scant knowledge or experience.  The more local state authorities are better suited to handle family law issues.

Dissent: Brennan

Theory: A state's involvement and actions with respect to children who suffer abuse can impose a duty upon the state to protect children from harm.

I. Special relationship theory: Brennan focuses on the actions taken by the state (active involvement in monitoring Joshua's abuse), rather than actions not taken by the state (Joshua's father inflicted the harm, not a state actor).

A.  Direct physical control by the state is not the only manner in which a duty to care and protect is imposed on the state.  A duty can also arise when the state has knowledge of an individual's situation and expresses its intent to help him.  The state's actions with respect to Joshua can amount to a limitation on his freedom to act on his own behalf or to obtain help from others.  Inaction, as when a state assumes a duty and then neglects it, can be just as harmful as direct action.

B. "A state's actions -- such as the monopolization of a particular path of relief -- may impose upon the state certain positive duties."  Also, the state could be complicit in a person's injury even though it did not actively cause the harm or create the situation that caused the harm.

C. Wisconsin's actions

1. The state established a child welfare system upon which its citizens could count on to protect endangered children from abuse.  The state's welfare system ultimately controls the decision of whether to protect a child from suspected abuse.  In effect, it has voluntarily assumed the duty to protect children in the state.

2. The effect of the state's child welfare system is to relieve others of any sense of obligation to help protect children; they now depend on the state to provide the necessary protection.  In fact, state law requires that potential avenues of assistance, such as doctors and law enforcement offices, direct cases of child abuse to the Department of Social Services.

3. The state, through DSS, intervened in Joshua's life and learned that he was in danger of suffering his father's abuse.  Because DSS had control over the decision to remove him from his father's home, it "effectively confined" Joshua to his father's violent home until it decided and took action to remove him.

4.  Because the state intervened and voluntarily assumed a duty to protect Joshua, its failure to do so did deprive him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty and property.

Dissent: Blackmun

I.  Active state intervention in Joshua's life triggered a fundamental duty to aid Joshua once the state learned that he was in grave danger.

II. The majority opinion relies too heavily on a strict, formalistic reading of the words of the Due Process Clause. 

A. The Abroad and stirring" Due Process Clause was designed to undo the formalistic legal reasoning that existed before 14^th Amendment's ratification.

B. The Court could arrive at a different result if it read the 14^th Amendment language and precedent more broadly instead of imposing a narrow construction.

C. I would adopt a sympathetic' reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging."

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